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This paper evaluates existing measures of political regimes and political freedom with respect to 
their desirability as indicators of political capabilities. It argues that the  focus  of desirable 
measures should be on the political and civil institutions that affect individuals’ opportunities to 
pursue their goals (their capabilities). Attempts to capture “actual” capabilities are misleading 
since they replicate what the existing HDI already does and muddle a measure that derives power 
from its simplicity. The paper then suggests indicators that are intuitive, clear and sufficiently 
encompassing to capture  the political and civil environment within which individuals must 
pursue their goals. 
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 1 
 
1. Introduction 
  One of the key insights of the theory of development underlying the Human 
Development  Index (HDI)  is that economic growth is only a limited indicator of 
development. Per capita income alone may provide a distorted view of development since 
high levels are equally compatible with extremely different patterns of income 
distribution and access to the conditions that impact an individual’s life chances. 
Examples of such disparities abound: think of Brazil, that combined one of the fastest 
rates of economic growth in the world  during the 1966-1974 years of military 
dictatorship, with a highly regressive policy of income redistribution; think of African-
Americans in the United States, a country with one of the highest per capita incomes in 
the world, whose life expectancy is lower than that found in many extremely poor 
countries; think of Sri Lanka or Kerala, where the population’s welfare conditions are 
higher than what their low levels of per capita income would lead one to expect. 
  These are well-known examples of disparities between income-based indicators 
of development and the actual welfare of the relevant population. They have been widely 
studied and frequently used in debates about development and there is no need to 
rehearse them here. I mention them to emphasize the point that the idea of the HDI is to 
provide an indicator of development that is broader than the one provided by per capita 
income; an indicator that provides a corrective, if you wish, of what per capita income 
alone might suggest in terms of actual welfare. 
  It was not until the work of Amartya Sen that this well-known limitation of per 
capita income as a measure of development was incorporated into a broader concept, 
which informed, as is well known, the elaboration of the HDI. Again, there is no need to   2 
rehearse Sen’s theory here, as it is well known by this paper’s intended audience. It 
matters, however, to explicitly say that it is a theory of development that should be 
assessed in terms of individuals’ concrete capabilities to formulate and achieve their life 
goals, whatever they are. 
  The HDI, now in its 20
th  year, is a successful expression of this broader 
conception of development. Part of its success is that it does exactly what one expected it 
to do, that is, it “corrects” the distorted reading that income-based measures of 
development provided in a way that conforms with widely accepted intuitions. Thus, 
tables comparing countries ranked by their per capita income and HDI values – one of the 
most popular instruments to support arguments in favor of a broader measure of 
development – place countries such as Brazil and Kuwait at lower levels of development 
and countries such as Sri Lanka and Botswana at higher levels of development. 
  In practical terms, thus, the HDI achieves its goal of providing a summary 
measure that captures a broader conception of development. It lacks, however, any 
information about the political and institutional environment where the material 
capabilities included into the HDI can be exercised. This has been noted from the very 
beginning and correcting it is the purpose of the current effort.  This paper seeks to 
contribute to it by evaluating existing measures of political and civil freedom as potential 
candidates to be used in the extension of the HDI. 
  I will argue that however the extension is implemented, it should focus on the 
political and civil institutions that affect individuals’ opportunities to pursue their 
goals, that is, that affect their capabilities. I argue that attempts to capture “actual” 
capabilities or to capture them directly, whatever this means, are misleading since they   3 
replicate what the existing HDI already does and muddle a measure that derives power 
from its simplicity. I then suggest a few indicators that are intuitive, clear and sufficiently 
encompassing to indicate the political and civil environment within which individuals 
must pursue their goals. Such indicator should be able to modify the reading of countries 
based on existing HDI much in the same way that the HDI modified the reading of 
countries based on per capita income. It should “compensate” for the fact that India, poor 
as it is, allows its citizens to pursue their own goals and influence the goals to be pursued 
by the communities they live in, and to “penalize” Cuba for providing such an 
opportunity to its citizens, even if it provides  for a relatively high level of material 
opportunities. 
  But this is an argument that is developed in the last section of the paper. I start the 
paper (section 2) by comparing existing measures of political and civil freedoms. Even 
though some of these claim to be conceptually closer to what one would want in a 
measure of political capabilities, they fail on other grounds and should be, I argue, 
eliminated from consideration. I then proceed to describe temporal and geographic 
patterns that three of the most widely used measures generate (section 3). I show that, 
with one exception, these patterns are broadly equivalent, which might suggest that one 
should be indifferent as to which measure should be used (even in spite of the flaws some 
of them contain, as noted in section 2). In section 4 I argue that the notion that these 
measures are interchangeable is misguided and address (and hopefully convincingly 
dismiss) each of the arguments that are used to support it.  Finally, in section 5 I try to 
develop a more  positive argument for how to extend the HDI, suggesting specific 
variables, some of which, but not all, are already available.   4 
2. Existing Measures 
  There is a relatively large number of measures purporting to capture democracy or 
political and civil freedoms in a given country at a specific point in time.
1
  Minimally, a measure of political and civil freedoms, or a measure of democracy, 
needs to have broad temporal and geographic coverage. It  should be current, with 
information up to at least the previous calendar year; and, preferably but not necessarily, 
it should provide data for a retrospective calculation of the original HDI. All existing 
measures are somehow related to the political and civil freedoms of citizens in a given 
country.  Depending on the measure, this may mean the occurrence of competitive 
elections, or the existence of a menu of practices that indicate the ability of citizens to 
express their opinions and act on them, or specific patterns of authority, or government 
accountability.  
 In this section I 
review existing measures and evaluate them according to dimensions I consider to be 
important in any measure of democracy and, consequently, in any measure that should be 
used for augmenting the HDI. 
  Appendix 1 lists existing measures of political regime. It should be immediately 
apparent that several of them should be eliminated on the grounds that they do not meet 
the minimal criteria stipulated in the previous paragraph. The GASIOROWSKI, the 
MAINWARING/BRINKS/PÉREZ-LIÑÁN (MBP), and the AFRICAN RESEARCH 
                                                        
1 I use “democracy” and “political and civil freedoms” interchangeably. Strictly speaking, of course, these 
two things are related but not the same. My own view is this: democracy is a method for deciding who will 
be authorized to make public decisions; political and civil liberties entail a bundle of “rights” granted to 
citizens of a country to actively participate in politics and be protected against arbitrary actions by the state 
and fellow citizens. Democracy cannot exist without some liberties. Even the most minimal definitions of 
democracy imply the ability to compete for the votes of citizens, which entail some or all of the following: 
the organization of the competition into groups such as political parties, the ability to “sell” one’s 
proposals, the ability to listen to them and ponder which one is preferred, and so on. Any operationalization 
of “minimal” definitions of democracy, therefore, necessarily involves these liberties. Conversely, 
measures of political and civil freedoms are used to construct scales or indices of democracy.   5 
PROGRAM (ARP) measures are limited in their geographic coverage. They focus, 
respectively, on developing countries, Latin America and Africa. Additionally, they are 
not current. The last year in GASIOROWSKI is 1992; MBP’ published data stop in 1999, 
although it has been extended to 2004;
2
  One thing that the remaining measures have in common is the fact that they are 
current and that they have broad temporal and geographic coverage.
 and ARP stops in 1995. The EIU’s index of 
democracy also falls into this group; it has a broad geographic coverage, but it only exists 
for the years 2006 and 2008. Of course had these measures offered a methodology that 
could be employed in augmenting the HDI, they might have been useful, even if not 
updated. However, I contend, although I do not show, that these measures do not 
represent particularly attractive solutions to the coding of political regimes and are, at 
best, equivalent to measures that are geographically broad and currently active.  
3
 
But what are the 
main differences among them?  
Levels of measurement 
  The first difference has to do with the level of measurement. Some measures are 
explicitly and intentionally discrete  (e.g.,  DD, GASIOROWSKI, MBP); others are 
explicitly and intentionally continuous (e.g., COPPEDGE/ALVAREZ/MALDONADO – 
                                                        
2 The extended data can be found in Pérez-Liñán’s website: http://www.pitt.edu/~asp27/ 
3 Geographic overage is a surprisingly complicated issue. Existing measures do not agree 100% on the 
countries that they cover. Polity IV, for example, excludes countries with a population less than 500,000 in 
the most recent year. Freedom House, in turn, includes territories and other non-independent entities. The 
coverage of the WBGI varies over the years depending on the availability of data. In 2008, there were data 
for 210 countries; in 1996 for 191. Even when no countries are explicitly excluded, there is no agreement 
about how the world is composed. Variation exists as to the treatment of countries that merge and break up 
or of countries that disappeared; it also varies depending on whether the criterion for inclusion is countries 
that claim to be independent (which includes Somaliland), or countries that belong to the United Nations 
(no Taiwan), or if includes entities that are not fully independent entities (such as Monaco, the Vatican, and 
Puerto Rico), and so on.    6 
CAM and WBGI); but others are considered to be continuous when they are, in fact, 
discrete (POLITY and Freedom House - FH). This is very explicit in FH, which assigns 
values from 1 through 7 depending on the number of points a country gets in the political 
or civil rights “check list.” Thus, countries that score between 36 and 40 points in the 
political rights checklist are coded as 1. In Freedom House’s words,  a value of 1 
corresponds to countries where “political rights come closest to ensuring the freedoms 
embodied in the checklist questions, beginning with free and fair elections. Those who 
are elected rule, there are competitive parties or other political groupings, and the 
opposition plays an important role and has actual power. Minority groups have 
reasonable self-government or can participate in the government through informal 
consensus.”
4  In turn, countries that score between 0 and 5 are coded as 7, a value 
indicating that “political rights are absent or virtually nonexistent as a result of the 
extremely oppressive nature of the regime or severe oppression in combination with civil 
war. States and territories in this group may also be marked by extreme violence or 
warlord rule that dominates political power in the absence of an authoritative, functioning 
central government.”
5
  One source of controversy regarding the level of measurement of political 
regimes involves what I consider to be a misunderstanding and is mostly directed against 
the DEMOCRACY/DICTATORSHIP (DD) measure, which is a discrete, dichotomous 
measure of political regime. The charge is against the use of a dicthotomous level of 
measurement on the grounds that higher levels of measurement are to be preferred over 
 
                                                        
4 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=341&year=2008, accessed on January 
19, 2010. 
5 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=341&year=2008, accessed on January 
19, 2010).    7 
lower levels of measurement: if one can measure democracy using a continuous, or even 
an ordinal, scale, the argument goes, then using a nominal, dichotomous measure implies 
an unnecessary loss of information (e.g., Bollen 1991, Collier and Adcock 1999, Elkins 
2000). 
  At first glance this seems to be a valid argument. Yet, it is incorrect. As we have 
seen, FH simplifies its measures by grouping the cases that score between 1 and 40 in its 
political rights checklist into seven categories. Many scholars, in turn, have chosen to 
simplify the measurement of political regime by “dichotomizing” an existing measure, 
for example POLITY, by using an arbitrary cutoff point along the –10 to +10 scale, such 
as +5, +6, or +7. This can be highly problematic (as will be seen below) and does entail a 
loss of information. But not all nominal dichotomous measures represent a simplification 
of the process of measurement and a loss of information. DD, for example, is not driven 
by the desire to simplify the measurement process. It does not imply imposing a cut-off 
point of any sort over an underlying, latent distribution of political regimes. Rather, it is 
based on the notion that political regimes can be directly observed and that one can 
distinguish two main regime  types, depending on whether the government is chosen 
through contested elections or not.  
  Thus, the proper level of measurement is, in part, a function of how one conceives 
of political regimes and what one thinks should be measured. The question is not simply 
whether one should choose to measure democracy with a discrete or continuous 
instrument. Prior to that one must decide whether one believes that political regimes 
come in types (e.g., democracies and dictatorships) or whether democracy is a 
(continuous) attribute of all political regimes.    8 
Aggregation procedure 
  Existing measures of political regime are based on multiple basic variables. DD, 
for example, uses information about the selection of the chief executive, the legislature, 
the number of parties or candidates competing in elections and the occurrence of an 
alternation in power to classify regimes as democracies or dictatorships. FH uses answers 
to ten questions about political rights and fifteen questions about civil rights to generate 
their 7-point  scale of political and civil rights. POLITY  is based on  seven original 
variables and BOLLEN  uses information on suffrage, party legitimacy, legislative 
selection and political rights to generate his index of democracy. Finally, in its 2008 
version, WBGI uses information from thirty-three different surveys to generate measures 
of each of its six dimensions of governance.  
  The procedures that are used to aggregate these different data sources vary in each 
of these measures. DD uses a conditional rule, according to which countries that fail in at 
least one of the four necessary requirements for democracy are classified as a 
dictatorship. In this sense, “dictatorship” in DD represents a residual type of regime, 
more properly labeled “non-democracy.”
6
                                                        
6  In its latest version DD offers a classification of non-democracies into “civilian,” “military,” and 
“monarchic,” depending on the nature of the effect chief executive. 
 FH and POLITY use a simple additive model, 
according to which each of the component variables has the same weight in the final 
measure. There are literally billions of possible combinations of political or civil rights 
that are distilled into the two 7-point scales of political and civil rights in the FH measure. 
With five alternatives for each of 10 and 15 categories, there are 5
10=9,765,625 possible 
ways to obtain a sum of scores between 0 and 40 in political rights, and 5
15= 
30,517,578,125 possible ways to obtain a sum of scores between 0 and 60 in civil   9 
liberties. In the case of POLITY, with 6 possible scores on the first dimension, 3 on the 
second, 4 on the third, 3 on the fourth, and 7 on the fifth, the possible combinations total 
6×3×4×3×7=1,512. In addition to  being arbitrary  (Treier and Jackman 2008), this 
aggregation procedure has implications for the validity of these two measures. Gleditsch 
and Ward (1997) show that only a small portion of these combinations actually appear in 
the data  and show with factor  analysis of the component variables that most of the 
variation in POLITY is driven by changes in the Chief Executive Constraints 
dimension.CAM and WBGI, in turn, use statistical models (factor analysis in the former 
and unobserved components model in the latter) to generate indices that are based on 
existing measures. Note that in both cases some of the datasets that are used as inputs are, 
themselves, already the result of some aggregation procedure (e.g., FH enters in both 
measures).  
  There are two main problems with these indices. First, the indices offered by 
POLITY, FH, COOPEDGE and WBGI, as with all indices, do not really correspond to 
any identifiable event in the real world. What is it that happened in, say, Bahrain in 2001 
that made it move from -9 to -8, and then to -7 in 2002 in Polity? What did the regimes in 
Albania, Burkina Faso, Jordan, Paraguay, Russia and Turkey had in common in 1999 to 
receive a 4 in FH? Finally, what happened between the last full year of president Ricardo 
Lagos in 2005 and the first full year of president Michelle Bachelet in 2007 for Chile’s 
score in the Voice and Accountability dimension of the WBGI to decline from 1.209 to 
0.975? Second, they make assumptions about the relative importance of each dimension 
that are not really justified. Thus, in all of these indices (with the exception of the WBGI   10 
and, less so, CAM, the assumption is that all dimensions are equally important, whether 
they are the occurrence of elections or the banning of fringe parties. 
 
Type of data 
  The last aspect along which existing regime measures differ is the nature of the 
data that  they  use. The usual distinction is between subjective and objective data. 
However, this is not a good way to characterize existing measures since it focuses the 
discussion on a straw man; after all, a measure of anything will necessarily involve some 
degree of subjectivity and it is really not productive to keep pointing this out.
7
  A more productive distinction is the one between data generated by subjective 
judgments and  data that are based on the application of rules to observable events. 
Measures based on data generated by subjective judgments are the most common of all. 
These judgments can be those of observers (experts) or those of people living in the 
country whose regime is being assessed. FH, for example, uses the judgment of expert 
observers; WBGI uses the judgment of both expert observers and individuals in the 
country (both elites and the mass public). POLITY, in turn, seeks to position itself in the 
middle with respect to subjective judgment and application of rules to observables. It 
recognizes the limitations of subjective judgments and the desirability of clear coding 
rules and has, over the years, considerably expanded the instructions to coders about how 
to proceed in specific circumstances. Yet, rather than generate rules that coders can apply 
to specific cases, POLITY  offers “ostensible” definitions of their categories, listing 
 
                                                        
7  See Mainwaring et al. 2001 and Fish 2005 for this kind of argument.   11 
examples and expanding, year after year, the list of cases to be included in each 
category.
8
  Of the existing measures, DD is the only one that adopts an alternative approach. 
In this case, from the definition of democracy as regimes in which governmental offices 
are filled as a consequence of contested elections, the authors proceed to define which 
offices they care about (executive and legislative)  and what they mean by contested 
elections (elections in which there is ex ante uncertainty, ex post irreversibility and 
repeatability). They then proceed to operationalize the notion of contestation so that one 
may distinguish between contested and non-contested elections and, therefore, identify 
democratic from non-democratic systems. They conclude that a regime is democratic if 
all the following four conditions are met: (1) the chief executive is chosen by popular 
election or by a body that is itself popularly elected; (2) the legislature is popularly 
 
                                                        
8  For example, the variable XRCOMP -  Competitiveness  of Executive Recruitment contains three 
categories: selection, dual/transitional, election. The instructions for coding a case as “selection” reads: 
“Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both, as in 
monarchies whose chief minister is chosen by king or court. Examples of pure designative selection are 
rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of presidents before their terms end; recurrent military 
selection of civilian executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent 
selection of successors; repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties, etc.” (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2005: 20). In turn, the variable PARCOMP –  Competitiveness of Participation, may take six 
values, one of which is “suppressed.” The instruction to coders reads as follows: “Some organized, political 
competition occurs outside government, without serious factionalism; but the regime systematically and 
sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the adult 
population) from participation. Suppressed competition is distinguished from Factional competition 
(below) by the systematic, persisting nature of the restrictions: large classes of people, groups, or types of 
peaceful political competition are continuously excluded from the political process. As an operational rule, 
the banning of a political party which received more than 10% of the vote in a recent national election is 
sufficient evidence that competition is "suppressed." However, other information is required to determine 
whether the appropriate coding is (2) Suppressed or (3) Factional competition. This category is also used to 
characterize transitions between Factional and Repressed competition. Examples of "suppression" are: i. 
Prohibiting some kinds of political organizations, either by type or group of people involved (e.g., no 
national political parties or no ethnic political organizations). ii. Prohibiting some kinds of political action 
(e.g., Communist parties may organize but are prohibited from competing in elections). iii. Systematic 
harassment of political opposition (leaders killed, jailed, or sent into exile; candidates regularly ruled off 
ballots; opposition media banned, etc.). This is evidence for either Factional, Suppressed, or Repressed, 
depending on the nature of the regime, the opposition, and the persistence of political groups. 
   12 
elected; (3) there are more than one party competing in the elections; (4) an alternation in 
power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to office 
must have taken place. Furthermore, rules about who should be considered the chief 
executive, how to identify legislatures, how to count political parties and how to identify 
an alternation in power are also specified (Alvarez et al . 1996, Przeworski et al. 2000, 
Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2009). 
  One need not agree with these rules, or believe that they are sufficient to 
characterize what one believes must be part of a measure of political regime. As a matter 
of fact, DD recognizes that the four rules are not sufficient to distinguish some cases. 
This will be further discussed below. What matters at this point is that there are rules, 
which have been defined ex ante, which are applied to each country in each year. 
Although the majority of cases are unambiguously classified by this rule, there are a few 
that are not.  The measure is defensible from a theoretical point of view (that is, it does 
capture an aspect that most people will agree should be part of a measure of democracy) 
and is reproducible –  anyone who applies the rules correctly should reach the same 
coding. 
  One last aspect the data used as input in measures of political regimes has to do 
with whether these data are original or not. DD, FH, POLITY, EIU, BANKS, MBP and 
GASIOROWSKI  generate their own data, whether they are based on subjective 
judgments or not. COPPEDGE and WBGI, in turn, process existing data into a new 
measure of regime. 
  There are, thus, four aspects along which measures can be evaluated: level of 
observation  (categorical  or continuous), aggregation procedure (additive, conditional,   13 
statistical), type of data (based on subjective judgment or on the application of rules); and 
whether the data used as input are original or not. Table 1 summarizes where each of the 
existing measures falls in each of these aspects. 
 
 
3. Geographic and Temporal Patterns 
  There are several papers offering a description of the geographic and temporal 
evolution of democracy in the world according to different measures. Here I will simply 
trace these patterns in broad strokes and show that, painted with such broad strokes, the 
measure that one uses does not really provide drastically different pictures.  I will 
concentrate on three measures – DD, POLITY and FH. The other measures are not active 
(GASIOROWSKI, MBP), or have limited temporal coverage (BOLLEN, EIU, WBGI), 
or have limited geographic coverage (GASIOROWSKI, ARP, MBP), are not based on 
original data (WBGI, CAM), or do not provide a direct measure of political regime 
(BANKS, DPI). In any event, all these measures are relatively highly correlated with one   14 
another, and the patterns that they would describe would not differ from the ones that 




  The aggregate patterns provided by DD, POLITY and FH are remarkably similar 
and, for most readers, already familiar. As we can see in figure 1, both POLITY and DD 
are compatible with what we know about the evolution of democracy in the post-WWII 
period: the reduction in the proportion or the level of democracy beginning in the mid-
1950s; the low proportion and level of democracy that characterized the 1960s  and 
1970s; and the so-called third wave of democratization that had fully started by the end of 
the 1970s. FH, which only starts in 1973, follows a pattern similar to DD and POLITY. 
  It is interesting to note that  the data do not show a decline in the level of 
democracy in the world. In 2007, the last year for which POLITY is available, the level 
of democracy in the world was the same as in 2005 and 2006: 0.68. This level, in turn, is 
the highest observed in the world since 1946 according to POLITY. The same is true with 
DD: in 2008, the proportion of democracies in the world was 0.61, again, the highest ever 
recorded since 1946. Of the three measures, FH is the only one that displays a downward   15 
fluctuation in the levels of democracy in the world at the end  of the period. This 
fluctuation is so minuscule (it exists only at the third decimal point) that is must be 
disregarded. Rounding to the second decimal point yields the same level of democracy 
for the 2005-2008 period, 0.68, which is the highest ever recorded by this measure. 
  Thus, although the expansion of democracy in the world has slowed down, the 
level or proportion of democracy has certainly not been reversed. This is true whether the 
measure one uses is DD, which focuses exclusively on the occurrence of competitive 
elections, or POLITY or FH, which are based on thicker definitions of democracy. 
  Regional patterns are noticeable. The core OECD countries started the post-1945 
period with the highest level of democracy, which became even higher (100% democratic 
according to DD) in the mid-1970s with the democratization of Portugal, Greece and 
Spain. Eastern Europe and Central Asia (that is, the countries that were either part of the 
Soviet Union or under its influence in the post-war era) experienced significant increases 
in the level of democracy only after 1989, as we know. According to DD, the proportion 
of democracies was zero until 1989, shooting up to around 60% in 1990. It is interesting 
to note that according to both FH and POLITY the communist countries of Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union had positive levels of democracy. It is hard, in my view, to 
understand what this positive reading indicates.  
  The evolution of democracy in the other regions was similar to the global pattern, 
albeit at different levels of democratization or proportions of democracy. In all these 
regions  we see a decline in democracy in the 1960s and 1970s and the subsequent 
increase in democratization at the beginning of the 1980s. The two regions where the 
assessments provided by DD, POLITY and FH are incongruent are South Asia and the   16 
Middle East and North Africa. In the former, DD depicts a relatively small decrease in 
the proportion of democracies between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 
1970s. This is mostly due to the combination of a relatively small number of countries in 
the region (6 in 1957, 8 in 1971) and the emergence of two new countries as dictatorships 
(Maldives in 1965 and Bangladesh in 1971). POLITY, in turn, registers a sharp decline in 
the level of democracy from 1957 to 1960 (from 0.500 to 0.325 in the normalized scale, 
mostly due to the sharp drop in the score for Pakistan and Nepal), but then an increase in 
the level of democracy beginning in 1962 and continuing until 1973. Similarly, in the 
1980–1992 period, POLITY sees an upward tendency while FH sees a downward 
tendency in the level of democracy in South Asia. 
  As to the Middle East and North Africa, the disparity seems to be between DD 
and POLITY, on one hand, and FH on the other. The former measures, but particularly 
POLITY, identify a pattern that is not unlike the global one: a decline in the level of 
democracy throughout the 1960s and 1970s and an increase after 1980, which continues 
until after 2000. FH, in turn, sees a relatively constant level of democracy between 1973 
and the early 1990s, with a decline between 1991 and 1994. 
  Note that while the measures are highly correlated in levels of democracy, they 
are not so when it comes to changes in political regimes. Here the relevant comparison is 
between FH and POLITY since DD is dichotomous.
9
                                                        
9 But, as we will see below, when we discuss table 5, the correspondence between DD and POLITY when 
it comes to regime change is not high. 
What we find is striking: the 
correlation between the annual percentage change between the two measures is only 0.34.  
Thus, the reading about the direction of regime change provided by FH and POLITY 
does not always coincide, as table 3 indicates. Regime change, of any magnitude, is   17 
relatively rare: it occurs in 25% of the country-years in FH and in 14% in POLITY. In 
67% of the cases (country-years), the two measures agree that noting happened from one 
year to the other when it comes to changes in the political regime. In 4% of the cases they 
agree that changes occurred and that they were in the direction of more democracy, and 
in 1% they agree that the changes were in the direction of less democracy. In the rest of 
the cases - 2,227 country-years, or 28% of all cases - the reading about the direction of 
change provided by the two measures is  different: either one of the measures sees 
changes when the other sees the maintenance of the status quo or, worse, one sees a 
change in the direction of more (less) democracy when the other sees a change in the 







  It is not surprising, thus, that the measures disagree in the identification of regime 
transitions. Categorical measures such as DD allow for the identification of the point in 
time  at  which the political regime changed. The regime changes when a new chief 
executive takes office (either simultaneously or after a legislative assembly) after 
competitive elections have taken place. Thus, as table 4 shows, according to DD, there 
were  174 regime transitions between 1946 and 2008, 67 from a dictatorship to a 
democracy and 107 from a democracy to a dictatorship. Latin America (and the   18 
Caribbean), as we would expect, is the region with the highest level of regime instability: 
whereas in the world there was 0.861 transitions per country, in Latin America there were 
2.030. If we exclude the Caribbean (and Guyana and Haiti, which have remained non-
democratic throughout the period), every Latin American country experienced at least 
one regime transition. Some of them experienced several: Argentina 9, Peru 8, Guatemala 
and Ecuador 6 each, and Honduras and Panama 5 each. South Asia is the other region 
where regime instability is relatively high, although 60% of them took place in Pakistan 








  Ordinal or continuous measures of political regimes allow for the identification of 
the process of democratization or the process of deterioration of democracy before the 
actual transition actually happens, or even if it does not really happens. To cite only one 
example, the long period of liberalization that preceded the transition to democracy in 
Brazil is captured in POLITY by the fact that the scores change from -9 in 1973 to -4 in 
1974 to -3 in 1980 to 7 in 1985.  
  Thus, while DD provides a reading of the precise point in time when a transition 
occurred, POLITY and FH allow the observer to measure the processes of change that are   19 
either aborted or lead to a regime change. The solutions to these limitations of each type 
of measure, however, also differ. If one is interested in identifying moments of change in 
the overall political climate or in institutions that preceded regime change, one could 
collect additional data, or even use the data that was originally collected to generate DD 
to characterize these changes. Thus, it is possible to trace the history of “liberalization” of 
(some) authoritarian regimes  by using information about the election of the chief 
executive, the legislature and the number of parties competing. It is only when these three 
things come together and an alternation in power occurs that a transition to democracy 
will have occurred. Similarly, aborted processes of liberalization may be captured 
through the observation of these same variables: they change, but they never come 
together to generate a transition to democracy. If this is not sufficient to characterize what 
the user wants, then further data may be necessary and can reasonably be collected.  
  Yet, if one wants to characterize the gradual changes, or lack thereof, that might 
have occurred prior to a transition from dictatorship to democracy using, say, POLITY, 
one will have to establish, first, a criterion for deciding when one will consider that a 
regime change actually occurred. One solution is to stipulate that a certain magnitude of 
change must occur in order for a regime change to have occurred. For instance, a regime 
change occurs if the POLITY score changes by, say, 6 or more points. Table 5 compares 
regime transitions coded in this way with the regime transitions coded by DD. We can 
see that the level of disagreement is high. According to DD, there were 154 regime 
transitions in the world between 1946 and 2007, 67 to dictatorship and 107 to democracy. 
According to POLITY, there were 201, 84 to dictatorship and 117 to democracy. The 
mismatch, however, is larger. There are 129 instances of regime transitions according to   20 
POLITY and DD does not identify as a regime transition; and there are 82 cases of 
transitions according to DD that would not have been identified as a transition by 
POLITY. These cases include military coups in Argentina (1955 and 1962) and Uruguay 
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Liberia (2006). The problem is not that DD is right and POLITY is wrong. The issue is 
that whereas DD maps specific events in the world to the concept of regime transitions – 
the four conditions for democracy came together in that year or one of them disappeared 
– POLITY does not. 
  Another solution is to categorize the scale by identifying a cutoff point. POLITY, 
for instance, recommends “a three-part categorization of "autocracies" (-10 to -6), 
"anocracies" (-5 to +5 and the three special values: -66, -77, and -88), and "democracies" 
(+6 to +10),”
10
  Yet, adopting arbitrary cut-off points is not entirely innocuous.  Cheibub, Gandhi 
and Vreeland (2009) replicated published studies that use POLITY as their main regime 
measure to demonstrate the importance of sharply defined and meaningful instruments to 
observe political regimes. They replicate one study in each of the following three central 
areas of research in political science: the effect of political regime on economic growth; 
the relationship between political regimes and civil wars; and the impact of economic 
 a recommendation that has been widely accepted. Doing this is only 
natural since many of the questions motivating research are concerned with being in or 
out of a given state such as the political regime, and not with incremental changes over a 
gradation. The entire “transitions” literature, for example, is predicated on the notion that 
one can identify the point at which a political regime stops being a dictatorship and 
becomes a democracy. Since scale measures or the categories of the existing multinomial 
measures do not represent any of the states that are theoretically identified, researchers 
are required to collapse regimes into categories so that they can study what brings these 
states about and the consequences of being in them. 
                                                        
10 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   22 
development on democratization. They show that while the arbitrariness of cut-points 
may produce results that are not robust to relatively small changes in coding rules, it may 
also lead to the opposite, namely, to a situation in which results are just too robust. 
Whereas we are generally expected to test for the former case, we tend to disregard the 
possibility of the latter. Thus, Epstein et al. (2006), seek to restore the causal impact of 
economic development on democratization by demonstrating that development matters 
once countries are classified as autocracies, democracies and “partial democracies,” 
which they “define” as the cases falling, respectively, in the [-10, 0], [+8, +10], and [+1, 
+7] POLITY intervals. The replication of the Epstein et al. study, however, demonstrates 
that their findings do not change regardless of how partial democracies are coded. They 
remain virtually unchanged as the lower bound of the “partial democracy” category is 
moved from +1 all the way to -9, and the upper bound is moved from +7 to +9.  
  Epstein et al (2006:566) assert that partial democracies are “critical to the 
understanding of democratic transitions.” As they argue, “More volatile than either 
straight autocracies or democracies, their movements seem at the moment to be largely 
unpredictable. One of our major conclusions, then, is that it is this category – the partial 
democracies  –  upon which future research should focus.” (p.566). But what is this 
category? Is it the category that contains the 811 observations that fall in the [+1, +7] 
POLITY interval, or the 4,205 that fall in the [-9, +8] interval? Unless we have a 
theoretical reason to classify regimes in a particular way – something substantive that 
tells us that regimes that are between +1 and +6 are different from regimes that are below 
+1 and above +6 – then the very notion of “partial democracy” makes no sense.  
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4.Augmenting HDI 
  Two facts emerge from the discussion in previous two sections: (a) that there 
exists several alternative candidate measures to be used if the HDI were to be augmented 
to incorporate political factors; and (b) that these measures offer broadly similar readings 
of the geographic and temporal evolution of democracy. This raises the following 
questions: 
•  Does it follow from these facts that the existing measures of democracy or 
freedom are interchangeable? Is it irrelevant whether one uses FH, POLITY, or 
DD to augment the HDI?  
•  Does it mean that, in spite of their imperfections, these measures are adequate and 
no further resources should be spent either improving them or generating new 
data? 
Here I want to argue the following points: 
A.  The measures are not interchangeable. 
B.  The argument about the adequacy of existing measures is fallacious. Spending 
resources to improve existing measures or to collect new data is not wasteful; it 
all depends on which improvements are to be made and what new data will be 
collected. Moreover, the amount of resources is not very large. 
C.  The choice is between a “maximalist” and a “parsimonious” approach to 
augmenting the HDI. 
D.  Assuming a preference for a parsimonious approach, there is one existing measure 
that could be used; and additional resources should be used to collect some 
specific new data.   24 
4.1. Are Existing Measures Interchangeable? 
  No, they are not. This is particularly so if we evaluate them from the perspective 
of an augmented HDI.  
  We have already seen that different measures generate quite different data about 
regime transition. Here we will focus on another issue. One of the main arguments for 
their interchangeability is that the existing measures are highly correlated. As table 2 
indicates, the correlations among the three main measures are, indeed,  high.  The 
correlation between FH and POLITY is 0.89; FH predicts correctly 87.5% of 
democracies and 92.6% of dictatorships classified by DD; POLITY predicts, 
respectively, 86.5% and 94.8%.These correlations are high; but not high enough, I 
believe, to see the regime measures as interchangeable.  
  There are other issues, however. In arguing that the different measures can be 
used interchangeably, issues of possible  bias  in these measures are neglected as 
unimportant. Although the possibility of bias is often  admitted, particularly in those 
measures that are based on subjective judgments, they are brushed aside, usually by 
invoking the argument that the bias is not large enough to cause serious distortions. This 
assertion, in turn, is supported by the fact that all the measures are highly correlated with 
one another. This fact is offered as evidence that the particular measure at stake must be 
capturing the true concept of interest, as if the other measures were, themselves, a good 
yardstick to evaluate the validity of what is being measured. 
  Bias, however, cannot be simply brushed aside as unimportant. There is bias of 
information, which emerges from the limited number of sources used in coding the cases. 
There is perception bias, which emerges because of the position occupied by those who   25 
perform the subjective judgment. For example, in a study of three measures of liberal 
democracy (one of which was the early version of FH), Bollen and Paxton (2000) found 
that each measure has its own specific component (a method-factor), which represents a 
source of systematic error in the evaluation of liberal democracy; that this component 
persists over time; and that the most likely sources for these error are extraneous 
information about the country being judged, which enters the judge’s evaluation process. 
For example, they conclude that “the Gastil [FH] method factor tends to favor countries 
that are non-Marxist-Leninist, Christian, monarchies, and older” (2000:77) 
  The high correlation of the measures is driven by the fact that their distribution is 
strongly bi-modal. There is a group of countries that always score high or low in all 
measures. Countries such as Sweden, Norway, England, the United States, the 
Netherlands,  or  New Zealand, will score high across all measures of democracy. 
Countries such as North Korea, Cuba, Sudan under the current regime, Albania under 
Hoxa, Iraq under Sadam, or Afghanistan under the Taliban will always score low across 
all measures. These countries are placed together at the high and or low points of the 
democracy measures, whereas the middle values are taken by cases such as Guatemala, 
Mali, Benin, Botswana, Malaysia, and so on, where the distinction between democracy 
and dictatorship, the amount of freedom effectively granted the population to participate 
in politics, or the degree of responsiveness of the government to the demands of citizens, 
is not clear cut. Once we remove the “unproblematic” countries from the dataset (e.g., 
countries coded at the extremes, countries that have never changed their code), we find 
that the correlation between the measures is, after all, not that high, as we can see in table 
6.   26 
















  Thus, it is the uncontroversial cases that may be driving the high correlation 
among different measures of political regimes. Existing measures that allegedly provide a 
more nuanced gauge of political regimes do not agree on where the countries located in 
the middle of the distribution should be placed. But these are the countries of greatest 
interest, both theoretically and practically. These are the countries where we see the most 
action, that is, where the measures are changing the most. It is important to evaluate what 
these changes mean. But if different measures provide different interpretations of these   27 
changes, how is one to trust that the measure one is using is the one providing a correct 
reading of these changes? 
  But even if all the changes occurred in the same direction, there would still be a 
problem at the middle of measures of democracy such as POLITY, FH and WBGI. What 
does progress mean in a given country? What happened in country X in year Y that led to 
a change from 3 to 4 in FH or from -1 to +1 in Polity? What does this mean and how 
would that orient decision-making about policies?  
  Thus, the argument that it does not matter which measure one uses since they 
provide the same broad patterns of freedom across the globe is not correct. They do so, in 
part because of their bi-modal distribution and the fact that the countries at the extreme 
are the ones that are “unproblematic,” in the sense that they receive the same scores 
across all the measures. 
 
4.2. Are Existing Measures Adequate? Are Additional Efforts Wasteful? 
  This is, perhaps the hardest argument to refute. The idea is that existing measures, 
by and large, “get things right” most of the time; investing resources to correct eventual 
mistakes would be inefficient. It would require too much to obtain too little. 
  This argument fails on two grounds. First, it assumes that what matters is simply 
general patterns and that whatever inaccuracies the data contain are innocuous. Second, it 
disregards the fact that any augmentation of the HDI with a political component will be 
subject to attacks by interested parties that were not placed where they believe they 
should have been placed, and that the best defense to such attacks is precision in the   28 
ranking. Precision is obtained with better data and that better data, in this context, I argue, 
must be data on observables.  
  The argument that existing measures are sufficient because they describe general 
patterns well assumes that this is all that matters for the constituency for an augmented 
HDI. That is, for those who will consume the augmented HDI, it does not really matter if 
country X was placed closer to country W than it is in reality since all that is necessary to 
know is their relative position. I believe that this is not really true. Countries will want to 
know why they were placed below some other countries and this is not the kind of answer 
that can be provided with general patterns. Moreover, the general patterns, as we have 
seen above, are mostly driven by the fact that the existing measures have a bi-modal 
distribution: not only do they have little to tell us about what distinguishes the countries 
that are in the middle of the distributions, but they do not agree with one another about 
where the countries are placed. 
  Finally, the inaccuracies hidden by general and broad patterns are far from being 
innocuous. As was seen in section 3, different measures can yield different conclusions, 
or no conclusion at all, regarding even general patterns. 
  One can anticipate that an HDI augmented by political factors will be 
controversial and that countries dissatisfied with their location in the index will become 
vocal about the flaws of the index. It is important, therefore, that the index be defensible. 
In the next section I argue that it will be defensible if it is based on a parsimonious 
approach. Here I want to simply state that the addition of a political component to the 
HDI that is defensible in terms of observable phenomena probably stands a better chance 
than a component that is based on subjective judgments.    29 
  This is true even if one tries to carefully estimate the margin of errors associated 
with the point estimates one provides about the location of countries. The WBGI, for 
instance, provides information about the margin of error for every country in each of the 
six dimensions that are aggregated into the governance indicator (it also provides the 
margin of error for the overall index). Although statistically correct, however, this 
procedure is also the indicator’s source of weakness. Consider the following story:  
The Director of the Great Lakes Center for Strategic Studies accused the World 
Bank of making severe blunders when ranking countries in central Africa 
(http://www.bloggernews.net/2006/10/world-bank-governance-report-
blunders.html). Specifically, the director of the GLCSS complained about the 
specific rating of the Central African Republic on Political Stability/No Violence 
(higher than Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda), and about the CAR’s overall 
directional trend (it improved in five of the six rating areas since 2004, including 
Voice and Accountability, the dimension closest to capturing democracy). 
The World Bank’s response revealed the difficulties in defending such an index. 
It blames the critic for failing to take into consideration the margin of error 
associated with the rankings of the CAR. Had the critic considered this 
information he would have seen that the differences between the CAR, Kenya, 
Rwanda and Uganda are in fact very small and that “one should not interpret any 
of the small differences he identifies between countries as being at all practically 
meaningful.” The critic, in turn, retorts:  “There are very large differences 
between Uganda and the Central African Republic and the Central African   30 
Republic and Rwanda. Their statistical results even with a margin of error factors 
should have revealed these differences.” (http://www.bloggernews.net/19) 
  Thus, in order to defend the indicator’s placement of countries at a particular 
location the authors of the WBGI had to argue that these differences should, in fact, be 
disregarded as having any practical consequence since their margin of errors imply that 
they cannot be distinguished from one another. Since they could not point to anything 
that might justify the placement of these countries in their indicator, they remained open 
to the criticism that the differences are indeed very large (and presumably not in the 
direction that they stated) and that the indicator should have captured them. 
  One final point about the efficiency of spending resources to collect new 
information of a particular type: it is not true that the amount of resources necessary for 
generating an augmented HDI on the basis of better data would require a large amount of 
resources. The issue is not about spending all possible resources to collect the very last 
piece of information with the largest amount of precision possible. The issue is one of 
making choices about how to conceptualize the political component, to generate explicit 
coding rules that are based on observables, and to incorporate the information into the 
existing HDI. The issue is between a maximalist approach, where everything is packed 
into the political component, or an approach that is parsimonious both in terms of what it 
seeks to measure and in terms of the information necessary to execute the measurement. I 
develop this point in the next section. 
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4.3. Maximalist and Parsimonious Approaches to Augmenting HDI 
  Expanding the HDI entails a choice between, for a lack of a better phrase, 
“maximalism” and “minimalism” or, perhaps more appropriately, parsimony.  
  A parsimonious approach is, I believe, in keeping with the original HDI, as well 
as with its extensions. Indices of any type will always be criticized, in part because the 
use of indices is, to a certain degree, a matter of preference or of the specific way one 
sees the word. The HDI has not been exempt from criticisms; yet, it has been widely 
accepted and used both in academic research and in policy arenas.   
  I submit that a large part of the HDI’s value is derived from the simplicity with 
which it captures an extremely broad and complex concept. As we know, the HDI is 
meant  to operationalize a view of human development as the expansion of people’s 
choices to lead the lives they value. As the 2002 HDR states,  “Fundamental to enlarging 
human choices is building human capabilities: the range of things that people can do or 
be. The most basic capabilities for human development are leading a long and healthy 
life, being educated, having access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living 
and being able to participate in the life of one’s community” (p. 13). The HDI 
operationalizes this view of human development by using information about life 
expectancy, education (literacy and enrollment rates) and per capita income. Each of 
these indicators is admittedly insufficient to capture all that is entailed in “leaving a long 
life,” “making choices,” and “having the necessary resources.” It can be argued that a 
long life is not necessarily an indicator of happiness; that functional literacy does not 
necessarily open up one’s horizon, or that universal primary and secondary school 
enrollment does not mean universal abilities (as the content of education varies), and that   32 
equally high average per capita incomes are compatible with drastically different patterns 
of income distribution. One could, therefore, pack all sorts of things into the HDI that 
would allegedly help provide a more nuanced or realistic view of a country’s situation 
with respect to material well-being. Yet, the HDI adopts a parsimonious approach; it is 
based on choices that were made to select indicators that, even if not perfect, have a clear 
and obvious correspondence to the concepts that they area meant to capture.  
  Maximalism is the current practice in most of the thinking about measuring 
political freedom or democracy, and is reflected in most of the existing measures. It is 
usually justified with statements that freedom (or democracy) is such a complex concept 
that “any system of measurement will diminish it” (Political Freedom and Human 
Development, p. 27). Consequently, as much as possible is packed into the measure as if 
aggregating as many angles as possible would make the final number truer to what 
actually exists. Thus, the UNDP’s early attempt to generate a political freedom index 
identified 21 factors grouped into five dimensions that capture the many kinds of freedom 
that exist. FH, as we have seen, uses 10 and 14 categories of political and civil rights 
respectively. And several other examples can be given. 
  Some of the reasons why this kind of approach is problematic have already been 
alluded to. Here I just want to add that a “maximalist” (or substantive if one prefers) 
approach to the measurement of democracy/political freedom runs two very apparent 
risks: (1) of including in the measure a number of outcomes of the thing one wants to 
capture (e.g., accountability, participation, satisfaction, etc.); (2) of either diluting the 
meaning of the concept of democracy or political freedom to something that cannot be   33 
recognized in the real world, or raising the bar so high that no really existing political 
system will ever meet the requirements to be considered free or democratic. 
4.4. Competitive Elections 
  A parsimonious approach to measuring democracy with the goal of augmenting 
the HDI consists of identifying one or a few aspects in a country that indicates some kind 
of movement with respect to the political capabilities of its population. The constraint is 
that whatever is identified as being the aspect of interest must be observable; and that its 
observability must be stated in terms of rules; that is, there must be explicit rules that 
operationalize the concept that describes the political capabilities of interest. I contend 
that the occurrence of competitive elections is a good candidate. 
  Let me start by saying that, paradoxically, elections have become a devalued 
commodity in the democracy trade, even though it is universally recognized as a 
necessary ingredient in any democratic regime. There is a lot of talk about the limitations 
of “electoralism,” the practice of equating democracy with the holding of elections. There 
is widespread recognition that the post-Cold War world is a different world, one in which 
the “norm” of elections has been absorbed by all (Donno 2008, Hyde 2010) and in which 
dictators cannot openly rule as such. Consequently, what we see is the emergence of 
regimes that hold the  “trappings” of democracy but which are not really democratic 
(Levitsky and Way  2002), that have at their disposal and employ a large menu of 
manipulation to make sure that their power is not at risk even when the façade of 
democracy has to be erected  (Schedler 2002). Democracy, it is said, in part as a reaction 
to the perceived emergence of this phenomenon, is much more than simply elections. 
Therefore, measures such as DD, which is strictly based on the observation of contested   34 
elections, are criticized for the excessive, misguided and naïve focus it places on the 
holding of elections. 
  This criticism, I contend, is itself misguided. For one, by giving short shrift to 
elections, it devalues an event that is, or can be, considerably empowering to the 
population that experiences it. The holding of multiparty elections in a non-democratic 
regime should not be underestimated. Consider the following:  
•  Perhaps the peacefulness of the transition to democracy in Mexico, or the fact that 
Mexico did not experience the kind of military dictatorship that the similarly more 
economically developed Latin American countries experienced in the 1970s, has 
to do with the fact that elections, even if non-competitive elections, were being 
regularly held.  
•  It is likely that the last elections held under many Communist regimes, in which 
non-communist candidates were able to compete against regime candidates not 
only had large consequences for subsequent developments, but probably made the 
population who voted for these candidates feel differently about their political 
capabilities. 
•  Regimes in Africa that held multi-party elections as a result of external pressure at 
the end of the Cold War did so reluctantly; but many accounts of these elections 
indicate an increase in the sense of empowerment or the political mobilization in 
the population.  
  The point is that these events – multiparty elections – are of great significance to 
those who participate in them, either as contenders or simply as voters. True, they do not   35 
necessarily imply that democracy, let alone “true” democracy, is in place; but their effect 
on the population’s sense of empowerment should not be neglected. 
  Most importantly, what is being suggested is not the use of elections pure and 
simple as a criterion for democracy, or for the presence of a degree of freedom that 
qualitatively changes the opportunities of the population to participate in the political 
process. What is being suggested is that the criterion be the holding of competitive 
elections. This is not a trivial detail. Rather, the qualifier that is used to describe elections 
that characterize a regime as democratic is of central importance in any  concept of 
democracy. This is the crucial element underlying the DD measure of democracy. 
   
5. How to Augment the HDI? 
I believe that any component used for augmenting the HDI with political information 
should meet the following minimum criteria: 
•  It should be descriptive (just as 78 and 38 years are descriptive of how long an 
average individual in the United States and Angola, respectively, could expect to 
live,
11  or as $34,200 and $10,200 are descriptive of the average income an 
average citizen of Germany and Brazil, respectively, could expect to have to fund 
his or her life projects
12
•  It should be reliable, in the same sense that “illiteracy” or “per capita income” or 
“life expectancy” are. That is, it should be operationalized  so that rules  for 
). 
                                                        
11  CIA, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html. 2009 estimates. 
12  CIA, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2004.html?countryName=&countryCode=&regionCode=A. Figures are GDP per capita, 
purchasing power parity, in 2009 US dollars.   36 
identifying specific cases are defined  which, if applied correctly, would yield 
similar readings for the same country. 
•  It should be “implementable,” in the sense that it should be viable as the object of 
a data collection effort; certainly prospectively, but also retrospectively. 
  DD meets these requirements and, as I argued in the previous section, it should be 
incorporated, if not serve as the basis for the augmentation of the HDI with political 
information. In any respects, DD should be sufficient as a measure of democracy. For 
instance, a measure of democracy based on a minimalist conception, is compatible with 
most of the theoretical issues that animate empirical research on political regimes. Thus, 
democracy is considered to undermine economic development because governments heed 
voters’ short-term interests (DeSchwinitz 1964, O’Donnell 1973), or they are considered 
to promote development because the possibility of punishment at the ballot box induces 
leaders to manage the economy well (Olson 1993). Additionally, macroeconomic 
performance may suffer because of governments’ attempts to manipulate the economy 
for electoral purposes (Nordhaus 1975 and Tufte 1978 for early formulations, and Drazen 
2000 for a review of recent development) or, alternatively, long-term economic 
performance may improve because voters can sanction incumbents at the polls (Paldan 
1991, Powell and Whitten 1993, Wilkin et al. 1997). Because elections allow citizens to 
influence policy by their control over leaders, they should result in lower inequality 
(Meltzer and Richard 1981, Przeworski 1990), better provision of public goods (Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. 2003, Lake and Baum 2001), greater involvement in trade agreements 
(Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002), and the avoidance of catastrophes such as 
famine (Sen 2000). Market-oriented reforms, in turn, may not be attempted or   37 
implemented consistently because governments fear voter’s reaction to them (Przeworski 
1991,  Haggard and Kaufman 1995) or, on the contrary, they may be attempted and 
implemented consistently because governments will be rewarded in future elections 
(Hellman 1998). Finally, the connection of voters to the government through elections is 
also central in arguments about the effect of political regime on the entry into and 
performance in war (Fearon 1994, Reiter and Stam 1998, Schultz 1999). In all of these 
areas of research, and many others, the mechanism that links political regimes to 
outcomes is the presence or the absence of contested elections. 
  Yet, I also recognize that for the purpose of expanding the HDI, DD is not 
sufficient since however it is done, the augmented HDI must be able to identify progress 
or reversals in the direction of more or less democracy. But this requirement does not 
imply the abandonment of the three conditions stated above. It does imply, however, that 
some kind of aggregation of the multiple pieces of information about each country will 
have to be adopted. And this is a serious challenge. 
  Partial order ranking may  solve what is now one of the most important 
deficiencies of existing measures that aggregate multiple pieces of information. This is so 
because it does not make any assumptions about the weight of each source of 
information. This alone is a great advantage of partial ordering. There may be others, as 
there may be limitations that are still not apparent. At the moment, however, I feel I can 
better contribute by suggesting some of the data that meet the requirements above and, 
consequently, could be considered as inputs for the partial ordering of countries in terms 
of their broad political conditions.   38 
  Let me start by stating that I am in broad agreement with the position articulated 
in the HDR 2010 Briefing Note (2010) regarding the definition of agency and 
empowerment. I find it helpful to start from Sen’s definition (“what a person is free to do 
and achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important”) and 
then think about how it can be captured once it is stipulated that the level of observation 
should be the national level. 
  Yet, I found the distinction between “agency itself” and “the preconditions for the 
exercise of agency” to miss something important already present in the HDR.  My 
understanding of this distinction is that it refers to the differentiation between “formal” 
empowerment and “actual” empowerment, with the former referring to the opportunities 
and the latter to the exercise of agency. Thus, as stated in the Briefing Note (2010:32), 
formal structures may allow empowerment but other factors may prevent it from actually 
occurring. In view of the existence of these two polar positions, the Briefing Note 
suggests that an intermediate position be taken, which considers both the institutional 
structures necessary for the exercise of agency and whether individuals actually exercise 
agency (“agency itself”). Under this conception, a measure of empowerment should 
include information about political and civil structures (the conditions) and direct 
measures of agency (which “seem to best capture prevailing perceptions on a large 
scale,” p. 34). 
  I would like to argue that introduction of “direct” measures of agency is not a 
good idea and that whatever measure is created to capture empowerment should stick to 
the conditions for exercising empowerment, or the political and civil liberties available   39 
for citizens to pursue whatever goals and values they find important. There are two 
justifications for this position. 
  First, as indicated in the Briefing Notes, existing direct data on agency are about 
individuals’ perceptions regarding the possibility of agency, which come primarily from 
the World Values surveys.  These data, however, do not necessarily provide a direct 
measure of agency. In addition to the issues of cross-country comparability that the 
Briefing Note raises, there are other problems stemming from psychological factors that 
cannot be accounted for in these surveys.  Thus, people may suffer from some form of 
delusion, even if mild, and believe that they control the outcomes in their lives when they 
really do not (e.g., younger people, high achieving people); they can be pessimists and 
believe that they do not control the outcomes in their lives, even when these outcomes are 
the result of their own choices (e.g., married people with children, recently unemployed 
people). Thus, reliance on perception of agency can be clouded by the fact that these 
perceptions can be distorted by psychological traits that may or may not be randomly 
distributed across the population. 
  Second, and more importantly, we must ask if we really want to measure agency 
directly. Or, to state it more precisely, we need to ask if we really want to measure 
agency again. For this is what we would be doing if we were to add to the HDR measures 
of people’s perception of how much control they have over their lives. The constraints 
that prevent agency – which a direct measure of agency would ideally capture – are, in a 
sense, the constraints already captured by the three components of the HDI as it exists 
now. Poverty (or very low income) constraints agency, just like education and a short life 
do. The HDI, thus, is meant to be a measure of capabilities, of people’s ability to shape   40 
their lives according to the goals they value, in other words, a measure of agency. What is 
missing from it is the political constraint: whether the political community in which the 
individual lives allows that individual to exercise the capabilities expressed in his or her 
income, level of education and life expectancy.  
  Thus,  expanding the HDI is not necessarily about introducing  measures of 
empowerment into  the index; the index is  already  a measure of empowerment. The 
expansion should introduce new information, such as, for instance, the political 
constraints individuals face. This kind of information would complement, and not 
duplicate, the information about the material constraints that are already present in the 
index. 
  With this in mind, thus, I believe that the kind of information that is needed refers 
to the opportunities individuals have to influence public decisions, and to the guarantees 
that others (fellow citizens and/or the state) will not prevent them from exercising that 
influence. Thus, what is needed is information about the formal framework for political 
and civil liberties. Finding indicators of political liberties – opportunities for influencing 
a community’s public decision-making  –  is easier than finding indicators of civil 
liberties. In the remainder of this section I make some suggestions, indicating, to the best 




•  Chief executive is popularly elected, directly or indirectly: 0 for not elected executive, 
1 for elected executive.   41 
o  An indirect executive election counts as a popular election if a body that is 
itself elected elects the executive. Thus, parliamentary systems in which the 
popularly elected legislature elects the president and supports the prime 
minister has a popularly elected chief executive; a presidential democracy 
such as the US has a popularly elected executive; but under the communist 
regimes, the party secretary, the effective chief executive, was not chosen by 
an elected body. 
•  Legislature is elected: 0 if no legislature, 1 if appointed legislature, 2 if elected 
legislature. 
•  Political parties: 0 if there are no parties, 1 if there is one party, and 2 if there are two 
or more parties. 
o  These are the only quantities that matter. Having two or three or ten parties 
does not make the election any more competitive or democratic; but having 
two parties, as opposed to one or none, is the condition for the election to be 
competitive. 
•  Alternation in power: 1 if it has happened, 0 if it has not happened. 
  These four variables are already coded in the DD dataset. They are the input for 
the classification of countries as democracy or dictatorship. One does not need to commit 
to the DD definition of democracy in order to use these variables as indicators of formal 
capabilities. Each of these measures can be justified as indicating significant differences 
in individuals’ capacity to influence their countries’ decisions. Thus, it is plausible to 
believe that an individual who lives in a country in which the chief executive and the 
legislature are popularly elected and in which two or more political parties compete for   42 
their votes, are more capable to influence public decisions than individuals who live in 
countries with an unelected executive and legislature and no political parties. 
  The alternation variable deserves a separate discussion. In the DD measure it is 
part of the operationalization of the particular view of democracy that it adopts (see 
section 2, “Type of Data”). Note that the task is to find rules that operationalize 
“competitive” in the competitive elections phrase. A regime in which elections are held 
for the chief executive and the legislature, and in which more than two parties compete, 
cannot be considered competitive if we know that the only reason that they are being held 
is that the incumbent knows he will not lose.  Since we cannot enter the heads of 
incumbents and discover their true intentions, we need to devise alternative ways to 
observe competitiveness. 
  As  Przeworski et al. (2000) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2009) 
extensively discuss, there are instances in which history provides information about 
which type of regime we are facing. Thus, when the LDP in Japan loses elections after 
having ruled for a long time and yields office to the opposition, we are confronted with 
evidence that incumbents were willing to yield power in case they lost. When the 
government in Malaysia wins an election but not by as much as it was used to (it won 
“only” a plurality in 1969) and, as result, declares a state of emergency, closes 
parliament, issues a harsh internal-security law, and rewrites the constitution in such a 
way as to guarantee that it will never lose again, we are confronted with evidence that the 
government was not prepared to yield power and that elections were being held just as 
long as the incumbents were assured to win. Unfortunately there are cases about which 
we do not know whether the regime is like Japan or like Malaysia. The typical case is   43 
Botswana, where elections have been held regularly since before independence, and the 
incumbent has won every one of them. Since we have not observed the incumbent 
yielding power or closing the political system, we cannot tell whether Botswana is like 
Japan or like Malaysia.  Botswana is not a middle case between democracy and 
dictatorship. It is not a partial democracy or a partial dictatorship. Botswana is either a 
democracy or a dictatorship. The problem is that we simply do not know which one.  
  Since the objective of DD was to produce a measure of democracy, we made a 
decision about what to do with cases such as Botswana. We decided, first, to explicitly 
identify them (the variable “type2” in the dataset flags these cases). Second, we decided 
that we would call these systems non-democratic, knowing that we were making a 
conscious choice to err in a particular way: even though there would be cases of true 
democracies we would be calling a dictatorship, we knew that there would be no cases of 
true dictatorships that we would call a democracy. This feature of the measure is 
frustrating and has led many to criticize it. Many people have argued with me that “we 
know” that Botswana is really democratic, and that Mexico at least before the Zedillo 
government (1994 – 2000) was not democratic. Except that when pressed to formulate 
the base on which that judgment was made, the only thing that could be invoked were 
“authorities:” all leading organizations classify Botswana as a democracy; as any African 
and you will hear that Botswana is a democracy; everyone knows that Mexico was not a 
democracy before Zedillo; the PRI could never lose; and so on.  
  Now, in the present context alternation in power would be used as one among 
several indicators of capabilities. The point that needs to be clear, however, is that it will 
always contain an ambiguity that can only be resolved as new historical information is   44 
produced. This is so because, assuming two countries identical on everything except that 
one has experienced an alternation in power while the other has not, while we will know 
that in the first citizens can remove an unpopular incumbent, we will never know if in the 
latter they can but do not want to or simply cannot. A further implication of the 
uncertainty around alternation is that the coding of specific cases may change over time 
as history provides new information. Thus, the coding of some years in Mexico between 
the original classification (released in 1996 covering the 1950-1990 period) and the 
current one (released in 2009 covering the 1946-2008 period) has changed from non-
democracy to democracy.
13
  Some may consider the possibility of using the four basic variables used to code 
DD to create an ordinal variable, which would categorize the countries that meet all the 
conditions to be coded as a democracy, those that meet all but one, those that meet all but 
two, etc. Part of the reason for this would be to address the fact that using DD to generate 
a partial ordering of countries yields just too few categories.
 This happens, I want to emphasize, not because we changed 
our opinion about what kind of regime Mexico was, but because we now have the 
information necessary to make a decision on the basis of our rules. 
14
                                                        
13 There is a rule, specified in Przeworski et al. (2000) and in Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2009) to 
decide how far back one must recode a country that experience an alternation but that was previously coded 
as a non-democracy on the grounds of the alternation rule.  
 This alternative, however, 
uses DD in a way that is not conceptually equivalent to it. In itself this is not a problem. 
The real problem comes from recent research on authoritarianism, which has shown that 
dictatorships that have legislatures and political parties - that is, dictatorships that "look 
like" a democracy - may be in equilibrium and can last for a long time. As a matter of 
fact, there is research showing that dictatorships with "democratic" institutions tend to 
14 This issue was raised by the HDRO staff in response to the first draft of this paper.   45 
last longer than those that do not.
15
  Other observable indicators of political liberties include: 
 The implication of this research is that a dictatorship 
with parties, legislatures and elections - a dictatorship that would be categorized as being 
closer to democracy - is not necessarily closer to becoming a democracy than a 
dictatorship without such institutions. This, in a sense, would undermine the reasoning 
for building an ordinal measure of regime on the basis of the conditions used to code 
countries as democracy or dictatorship in DD. 
•  Are there elected sub-national units? 0 for no, 1 for yes. 
o  At first thought this variable would be biased by the fact that federations 
would tend to have sub-national elections more often than non-federations. 
But I am not sure this is the case as I can think of many non-federal states 
where mayors or provincial officials are elected (Bolivia, France are two 
examples that come to mind). But perhaps it would be a good idea to check it. 
•  Are there legal exclusions (other than age, incarceration and profession, e.g., military, 
clerics) from the right to vote? 
o  The coding of this variable is not simple. There are two approaches. 
  Przeworski, in a dataset not yet released for public use, codes (at least 
since the 19
th century), legal exclusion on the basis of social class, 
education and ethnicity. 
                                                        
15 The literature on authoritarian regimes is vast and rapidly increasing. Magaloni (2006) analyzes México 
and shows that the regime survived for a long period in an equilibrium that did not depend on the use of 
force; it was the "democratic" institutions of the regime that allowed it to sustain itself in power. Gandhi 
(2008) and Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) show that dictators that allow for multiparty legislative elections 
last considerably longer in office than those that limit or abolish legislative elections. For a review of the 
recent literature on authoritarianism, see (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009).   46 
  Paxton et al. (2003) adopt an approach according to which estimated 
population shares of existing exclusions are subtracted from 100 to 
produce a figure that is meant to represent the extent of suffrage. 
  I personally have a preference for the first approach as I find it less 
subject to error. But both meet the criteria for an indicator to be 
included in the HDI expansion. 
•  Percentage of female participation in the legislature or ratio of female representation 
in the legislature to that of male representation. 
o  One problem with this variable is that it is discontinuous. It ranges from 0% to 
100&, or from -1 to 1. But 0 may mean the absence of any female in the 
legislature and the absence of a legislature. 
 
Civil liberties 
  Finding adequate indicators for civil liberties is harder than finding adequate 
indicators for political liberties. As far as I know, all the indicators currently in use are 
based on subjective judgments and, for this reason alone, should be rejected. It may help 
to think of civil liberties as consisting on the ability to pursue one’s individual goal in the 
context of a community. Violations of this liberty may come from the state (the focus of 
most of the existing literature) or from fellow citizens. These liberties are also more 
likely to be present if there is an environment of rule of law, however it is expressed. 
With these considerations in mind, here are some candidates: 
•  Murder rates in capital cities.   47 
o  Murder rates indicate the extent to which citizens can act in their community 
without fear of being attacked by fellow citizens. It seems to me to be intuitive 
that citizens in Oslo or Stockholm feel better protected in pursuing whatever 
their goals are than citizens in Rio de Janeiro or Washington, DC.  
o  I do not know of any datasets that contain this information, but I must also say 
that I have never looked for it. Focus on the capital city can be justified in 
terms of data availability. But it is also likely that this would be the place 
better protected since this is where the political class circulates. It, in this 
sense, reflects the best case for the country and represents an upper bound of 
protection. It just occurred to me, however, that Rio de Janeiro, for example, 
is not Brazil’s capital city and that murder rates there are considerably higher 
than in Brasília. 
•  Are there restrictions on women’s rights to own property or to divorce? 
o  These are restrictions that clearly limit the freedom of a significant part of the 
population. Including divorce, however, may be an issue given that marriage 
is interpreted differently across religions. I am not sure if there is a religious 
justification for restricting property rights to men. 
•  Weighted (by population or some other factor) number of legal periodicals published 
in the country. 
•  Weighted (by population or some other factor) number of law schools in the country. 
o  Collection of information on these two variables is about to be completed by 
Peter Nardulli at the Cline Center for Democracy at the University of Illinois.   48 
It is part of larger project on the rule of law, which includes attempting to 
generate indicators that meet the requirements stipulated above. 
•  Constitutional provisions that explicitly guarantee civil liberties (e.g., entrenchment 
of individual rights, judicial structure). This information can  be extracted from 
original constitutional documents, assembled by the Comparative Constitutions 
Project at the Cline Center for Democracy. These documents are available for 
consultation, but are also coded for over 800 variables that can be readily used. 
Information about the CCP can be found at 
http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ 
 
  Finally, I would like to call attention to a large project, also being developed at 
the Cline Center for Democracy at Illinois that may generate a wealth of information to 
be used in measures of political and civil freedom, as well as related concepts. This is the 
SPEED project (Social, Political, Economic Events Dataset). Here is not the place for me 
to discuss all the details of this project,
16
•  It is an events database; it focuses on things that actually happened in a country 
and on not what a given actor thinks happened. 
 the usable outcome of which is still at least a 
couple of years ahead (if funds are secured for its continuation). But the main highlights 
include: 
•  It uses two massive source of information: the reports of the Foreign Broadcast 
Information  Service (FBIS), which have existed from at least 1945, and the 
Summary of World Broadcast (SWB), which covers the 1979-2008 period. The 
                                                        
16 An 8-minute video overview of the SPEED project as a whole, the process, and its  
eventual applications may be found at: http://crisismapping.ning.com/video/iccm-2009-automated-
crisis>http://crisismapping.ning.com/video/iccm-2009-automated-crisis   49 
Cline Center has access to all of these reports (an estimated 4,393,121 from FBIS 
only), had digitized all of them and is now in the process of developing a protocol 
to treat the information they provide. 
•  Because of its extensive coverage, the reporting bias in the FIBS and SWB reports 
are not large, and certainly orders of magnitude smaller than the bias present in 
event data bases that rely on one or just a few Western journalistic sources (see 
Leetaru 2010 for a detailed analysis of the geographic and language distribution 
of these reports). 
  The kinds of information that we will be able to get from this dataset that we do 
not now have include information about the conduct of elections, a count of all sorts of 
popular demonstrations, violations of individual rights, disputes over property, just to cite 
a few. 
*  *  * 
  To conclude, then, the main point is, in my view, the following: it is important to 
keep the concept of capabilities “clean,” and not bring into it more than it can 
meaningfully handle. If we consider that the HDI is already an attempt to measure 
“material” capabilities, the extension under consideration should entail information about 
the political opportunities individuals have to exercise their capabilities. Partial order 
ranking seems to provide a solution to one of the most vexing problems in 
multidimensional measures of political and civil liberties. It makes no assumptions about 
the weights of each element in the measure and yields sufficient differentiation among 
the countries to allow for the identification of several “stages” of political capabilities. 
There are several existing variables that can enter into such a measure of political   50 
capabilities, which meet the requirements of being descriptive, reliable (reproducible) and 
feasible. 
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APPENDIX   
Measures of Democracy and/or Political Freedom 
 
1 – ARP – AFRICAN RESEARCH PROGRAM 
Producers 
Robert Bates and others. 
Coverage 
46 Sub-Saharan countries, 1970 – 1995. 
Measure 
Categorical measure (six categories) of electoral institutions. 
Location 
  http://africa.gov.harvard.edu/ 
 
2 – BANKS - CROSS-NATIONAL TIME SERIES DATA ARCHIVE 
DATABANKS INTERNATIONAL 
e-mail:   support@databanksinternational.com  
mobile phone: +972-52-521-1523 
phone: +972-2-566-9340  
fax: +972-72-233-4160  
contact person:   Ken Wilson, Technical Support 
Coverage 
As of January 2010, 234 entities, that is, contemporary and historical countries 
since 1815. 
Measure 
Does not contain a direct measure of political regime. But offers a number of 
variables that can be used, and have been used, to construct regime measures. For 
example, Bollen directly takes variables from this dataset to use in the 
construction of his liberal democracy measure. DD starts with two of the Banks 
variables but considerably changes and recodes them. The variables of interest 
are: Number of Seats, Largest Party in Legislature; Size of Legislature (Lower 
House); Effectiveness of Legislature; Competitiveness of Nominating Process; 
Party Coalitions; Party Legitimacy; Size of Legislature/Number of Seats, Largest 
Party; Party Fractionalization Index; Type of Regime (coded as civilian, military-
civilian, military and other); Number of Coups d'état; Number of Major 
Constitutional Changes; Head of State; Premier; Effective Executive (Type); 
Effective Executive (Selection); Degree of Parliamentary Responsibility; Size of 
Cabinet; Number of Major Cabinet Changes; Changes in Effective Executive; 




This is a proprietary dataset and it is of relatively high quality (in the sense that 
once one examines specific variables, one does not find many coding mistakes. 
However, sources are not provided. 
 




187 countries for 1972 through 1988 
Measure 
A measure of liberal democracy (LIBDEM), defined as: 
LIBDEM = (X1 + X2)/2, where X1 = SUFF if SUFF < [(POLRT + LEG)/0.2], 
otherwise X1 = (POLRT + LEG)/0.2; X2 = PARTY*10; SUFF = Percent of adult 
population over 20 years of age who have the right to vote in a national election 
(with no consideration of whether the election was free or fair) (from Kenneth A, 
Bollen, Robert W, Jackman and Hyojoung Kim, 1997, “A Comparative Analysis 
of Suffrage, Registration, and Turnout.” University of North Carolina, Chapel 
Hill, NC.); POLRT = political rights, a seven-category variable based on 
Gastil/Freedom House; LEG = legislative effectiveness*legislative selection 
(from Banks); and PARTY = party legitimacy (from Banks) 
Location 
ICPSR study no. 2532. 
 
4 – CAM - COOPEDGE, ALVAREZ AND MALDONADO 
Producers 
Michael Coppedge, Angel Alvarez, and Claudia Maldonado, “Two Persistent 
Dimensions of Democracy: Contestation and Inclusiveness,” Journal of 
Politics70:3 (July 2008): 632-647. 
Coverage 
203 countries for 1950 through 2000 
Measure 
Two continuous measures reflecting contestation and inclusiveness of political 
regimes (following Dahl 1971), produced by a factor analysis using 19 variables 




5 – DATABASE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
Producers 
Philip Keefer and others. Development Research Group, the World Bank. 
Coverage 
181 countries between 1975 and 2006. 
Measure 
A regime indicator can be derived from the variable EIEC (Executive Index of 
Derivative Competitiveness). According to the authors, when coding a variable 
that indicates the tenure of the political regime (democratic or autocratic), “if 
EIEC is below 6, the country is deemed autocratic or a country in which 
democratic institutions are not consolidated and leadership is personality-based” 
(p. 19). EIEC of 6 or 7 is, therefore, democratic.  





6 – DD - Democracy and Dictatorship 
Producers 
José Antonio Cheibub (University of Illinois), Jennifer Gandhi (Emory 
University), and James Raymond Vreeland (Georgetown University) 
Coverage 
202 countries between 1946 and 2008 
Measure 




7 – EIU’S INDEX OF DEMOCRACY 
Producer 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Coverage 
165 countries for 2006 and 2008 
Measure 
An index constructed by averaging scores on 60 indicators grouped into five 
categories (electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of 








Covers the years 1973 (with 151 countries) through 2008 (with 193 countries) 
Measure 
Two measures: political freedom and civil freedom.. They range from 1 (most 
free) to 7 (least free). In response to the question: What does Freedom in the 
World measure? Freedom House states the following in its website: “The survey 
measures political rights and civil liberties, or the opportunity for individuals to 
act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and 
other centers of potential domination. As such, the survey is primarily concerned 
with freedom from restrictions or impositions on individuals' life pursuits. > 
“While the survey considers restrictions on freedom imposed by governments, it 
does not measure government performance per se. Rather, it measures the wider 
state of freedom in a country or territory, reflecting both governmental and non-
governmental constraints. > “Similarly, the survey does not explicitly measure 
democracy or democratic performance. Rather, it measures rights and freedoms   54 
integral to democratic institutions.” 
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=277) 




9 – GASIOROWSKI 
Producer 
Mark J. Gasiorowski. 1996. “An Overview of the Political Regime Change 
Dataset.” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 29, no.4, 469 – 483. 
Coverage 
97 largest Third World countries, from independence through 1992. 
Measure 
Classifies regimes as democratic, semi-democratic, authoritarian, and transitional. 
Location 
Article cited above. 
 
10 – MBP – Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Líñan 
Producer 
Mainwaring, S., Brinks, D, and Pérez-Liñán, A. (2001). “Classifying Political 
Regimes in Latin America, 1945-1999.” Studies in Comparative International 
Development 36 (1): 37-65. 
Coverage 
Nineteen Latin American countries between 1945 and 1999. 
Measure 
 Trichotomous classification (Democracy, Semi-democracy, Authoritarian) 
Location 
Article cited above. 
 
11 – POLITY 
Producers 
Monty G. Marshall, director and principal investigator (George Mason 
University), Keith Jaggers, principal investigator (Colorado State University) and 
Ted Robert Gurr, founder (University of Maryland) 
Coverage 
“Major independent states in the global system,” which means 163 countries with 
total population of 500,000 or more in the most recent year, for the 1800 – 2008 
period. 
Measure 
Measures of democratic and autocratic authority patterns, ranging from 0 through 
10 and the Polity Score, generated by subtracting the autocratic from the 
democratic measures of authority patterns, thus ranging from -10 (least 
democratic) to +10 (most democratic).   
 
12 – VANHANEN 
Producer   55 
Tatu Vanhanen, Democratization and Power Resource, 1850 – 2000. 
Coverage 
187 countries between 1810 and 2000 
Measure 
Three regime measures: (1) Competition, which is calculated by subtracting the 
percentage of votes/seats gained by the largest political party in parliamentary 
elections and/or in presidential (executive) elections from 100%; (2) Participation, 
which is an aggregate of the turnout in elections (percentage of the total 
population who voted in the same election) and the number of referendums. Each 
national referendum raises the value of Participation by five percentage points and 
each state referendum by one percentage point for the year of the referendum. The 
upper limit for both variables is 70%; (3) Index of Democratization, which 




13 – WBGI (World Bank Governance Indicators) 
Producers 
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi 
Coverage 
212 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, and annually for 2002-2008 
Measure 
A continuous indicator of six dimensions of governance, constructed with an 
unobserved components model based on a large number of variables coming from 
a large number of datasets. All variables are subjective judgments by elites and/or 
mass publics. The five dimensions are:  (1) Voice and Accountability (VA) – 
capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. (2) Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence (PV) – capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will 
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically-motivated violence and terrorism. (3) Government Effectiveness (GE) 
– capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. (4) Regulatory Quality (RQ) – capturing 
perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. (5) 
Rule of Law (RL) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. (6) Control of Corruption (CC) – capturing 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests.  
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